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      There is considerable literature on price pass-through modeling. This literature has focused on pass-through of cost 
shocks for homogenous products. To get results with the homogenous products case, empirical implementation has 
required the maintained hypothesis of competition, or agreement, in quantity modeling. A major contribution of this paper 
is modeling pass-through for a differentiated products market under the maintained hypothesis of price competition or 
price agreement. We estimate a mixed logit model for U.S processed cheese market using unbalanced panel data and 
implement a price pass through simulation and related consumer welfare analysis under different regimes of competition.    
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1. Introduction 
 
‘Pass-through’ refers to the phenomenon through which a change in input cost transmits into a change in price.
1 
Under perfect competition, pass through is determined by the relative demand and supply elasticities. When demand 
is more inelastic and supply more elastic, pass-through is greater. When input supply is infinitely elastic, pass-through 
is 100% in the competitive case.
2  In the case of linear demand and infinitely elastic input supply, a monopolist passes 
through only half of an input cost change.
3 Recognizing the importance of market structure on the price pass through, 
some theoretical models have analyzed the effects of cost shocks under imperfect competition primarily using 
conjectural variation analysis in quantity competition.
4 
Very little effort has been devoted, however, to analyzing the effect of cost change on prices in differentiated 
product markets.
5 Most theoretical work has focused on homogenous products with quantity competition and much of 
the empirical work is based on reduced form analysis using industry level data.
6   
This paper analyzes how market power influences a firm’s price pass through behavior in a differentiated 
product market with price as the strategic variable. In differentiated product markets, all firms have some degree of 
market power and charge prices in excess of short-run marginal costs. This market power depends on how closely 
products are located in the product space and the pricing game that firms play. For a given cost shock, the pass-
through rate for each firm will be different depending on each firm’s unilateral market power and the degree of 
coordinated market power that is being exercised in the market.   
In differentiated product markets, the comparative static analysis which has been extensively used in 
homogenous product markets will not work well because it is very difficult to estimate pricing relationships as the 
number of products in a market increases. Hence, we employ a different approach. In this paper, we introduce a 
simulation-based approach to pass-through analysis using a structural model.  We estimate a mixed logit demand 
system.
7  Given the estimated demand surface and estimated marginal costs, we solve to obtain new equilibrium 
prices for hypothetical cost shocks.  In fact, we estimate price pass through for two alternative pricing games, Nash-
Bertrand and fully collusive pricing.
8 Finally we implement a specification test to determine which games best fit the 
data.  
Our empirical work is for the U.S processed cheese market. For the estimation of processed cheese demand, a 
discrete choice model is a good option. Processed cheese is a special use product produced for sandwiches and 
hamburgers. The use of this cheese adds very little to the total cost of a meal.
9  Accordingly, for many consumers, the 
choice is not so much how much processed cheese to buy as which processed cheese to buy. To the extent this is the 
case, the discrete choice model is well suited for the demand side of the model.  
We proceed as follows. In section II, we explain U.S processed cheese market and data. In section III, we 
estimate a mixed logit demand model using unbalanced panel data to accommodate the entries of new brands during 
                                                           
1 Pass through literature has developed in the area of exchange rate pass through, tax pass through, agricultural product price 
transmission and recently merger analysis.  
2 Here, it is implicitly assumed that manufacturers and retailers are vertically integrated. If they are separated, the assumption of 
constant return to scale on retailers’ cost function may also needed.  
3 See Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983). 
4 Refer to Stern (1987), Katz and Rosen (1985), Besley (1989) and Deliphia and Keen (1992). 
5 Some available studies include Fershtman et al (1994), and Dhar and Cotterill (2000). The former employs a nested logit model 
to analyze the effects of changes in the taxation regime on equilibrium prices, firms’ profits and consumer surplus in the Israeli 
automobile market. The later develops a model of price pass through and strategic pricing within a channel for two successive 
oligopolies that sell differentiated products. 
6  Sumner (1981) and Sullivan (1985) studied cigarette taxes. And Karp and Perloff (1989) investigate the Japanese TV market.  
Besely and Rosen (1996) studied tax pass through for various commodities in the U.S cities.  
7  Refer to BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001).  Nevo(2000) applied the model for merger analysis and Petrin (2001) used the model to 
estimated the consumer benefits of new products in the automobile industry.   
8 Karp and Perloff (1989) explain if a researcher misspecifies strategic conduct in the market, the estimation of price pass-through 
can be biased. 
9 According to Gould and Lin (1994), the annual expenditure for processed cheese was $ 20.01 for average households. This data 
is based on Nelsen Scan Track panel data for 8,922 households from March 1991~March 1992.   Market Structure, Price Pass-Through, and Welfare With Differentiated Products  Kim 
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the sample period.  We recover marginal cost and markup for each brand in each solution. Next, we implement 
counterfactual simulations of price pass-though and analyze the consumer welfare implications of our alternative 
solution concepts. In section IV, we discuss about the empirical results and in section V, we do a model specification 
test. We conclude in section VI.  
 
 
2. Processed Cheese Market And Data 
 
Processed cheese is the largest selling type among all cheese types and it is primarily sold pre-sliced in packages 
or in individually wrapped slices in packages.  
Table 1 shows the market shares and average prices of leading processed cheese brands. Three brands- Kraft, 
Velveeta and Borden-are the major brands in the market.  Phillip Morris with Kraft, Velveeta and other brands, has a 
dominant position in the market among national brands. Borden Inc is a distant second to Phillip Morris and the other 
national brands, such as Land O’Lakes command very small shares.   
During the sample period, from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1992, the volume shares of 
Phillip Morris’s main brands, Kraft and Velveeta, decreased from 32.43 to 23.49 and from 25.49 to 19.40, while the 
combined share of the company decreased from 58.97 % in the first quarter of 1988 to 51.77 % in the fourth quarter 
of 1992. Phillip Morris recaptured some of the lost market share by introducing Kraft Free, Velveeta Light and Kraft 
Singles.
10 The structure of the processed cheese industry is a good test ground for a firm’s strategic behavior. How 
does Phillip Morris position its products? Are Phillip Morris’s brands closer substitutes with each other than with 
other brands?    
  Data consists of price, market share, product characteristics and demographic variables.
11  T h e  p r i c e
12 and 
market share are quarterly from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1992.  Each city-quarter combination 
is defined as a market.  The number of total markets in the data is 680.
13 For the analysis, 10 brands are selected.  The 
number of brands varies from 7 to 10 depending on markets adding to the unbalanced nature of the data set.  Among 
the 10 brands, Kraft, Borden, Velveeta and Land O’Lakes are the regular segment processed cheese brands.  We also 
include brands from the low calories segment brands to analyze the competition by segment.  These low-fat, low-
calories and high-priced brands capture primarily those consumers who are very sensitive to fat level and are less 
sensitive to price.  
Product characteristics were obtained from nutrient fact books that were published during the sample 
period.  Demographic variables are sampled from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These include 
income, age, child and race.
14 We define the child variable as 1 if the age is less than 17 years old and 
otherwise as 0. For the nonwhite variable, its value is 1 if an individual is nonwhite and 0 if an individual is 
white. Income is household income divided by the number of household members.   
 
3. Model  
 
3.1. Demand Specification 
Demand for processed cheese is estimated with a discrete choice model.
15 The demand system we use represents 
                                                           
10 The introduction of new brands would also allow it to raise prices on its existing brands because some of the demand it will 
lose will not go to competitors’ products, but will instead go to its own new brands. Also, the brand proliferation might be used 
for entry deterrence as in other industries (Schmalensee, 1979, Scherer, 1982). 
11 See Table 1 and Table 2 for data summary. 
12 The price is net of any merchandising activity. Thus, a price reduction for a promotion is reflected in the price.  Price is deflated 
using the regional city CPI and converted to real price per serving (28g). The price and quantity data were collected by 
Information Resources Inc.  
13 The number of cities ranges from 28 in the first quarter of 1988 to 43 in the fourth quarter of 1992. 
14 The selection of demographic variables is based on the previous studies on the cheese industry. These include Gould et 
al.(1994), Hein et al.1990), Gould(1992). 
15 We are closely following BLP(1995) and Nevo(2001) for demand specification. Market Structure, Price Pass-Through, and Welfare With Differentiated Products  Kim 
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ijm jm i i jm jm ijm ux p β αξ ε =−+ +
consumer preferences for products as a function of individual consumer characteristics and characteristics of the 
products.
16  We assume that consumers choose one unit of the processed cheese brand that offers the highest utility 
and that they choose only one brand during each shopping trip.  The indirect utility of consumer i from brand  j  at 
market  m  depends on the product characteristics and consumer:  ) : , , , , ( θ ξ i i jm jm jm ijm v D p x U , where  jm x , jm p  
are observed cheese characteristics and prices and  i D , i v  , jm ξ  are observed individual characteristics, unobserved 
individual characteristics and unobserved cheese characteristics, respectively. And θ  is an unknown parameter vector 





where  i α  is consumer i ’s  marginal income utility and  i β  represents individual specific parameters and ijm ε  is a 
mean zero stochastic term, respectively. Thus, the parameters of the utility function are different for each consumer 
i.
17 
The indirect utility can be divided into two parts.  The first part is the mean utility level of brand j in the market 
m ,  jm δ , and the second part is the deviation from the mean level utility, which captures the effects of the random 
coefficients. Hence the coefficients on the mean utility function are the same for all individuals and the random 







(3)         
  
                




       
 
ijm µ  represents the interaction of price and product characteristics with the observed demographic variables  i D  
and unobservable individual characteristics  i v . The  i D  is an  1 × L  vector for each individual. The unobserved 
individual characteristics, or  i v ’s, are random draws from the multivariate normal distribution,  1 , 0 ( + K I N ), where 
1 + K  draws for each individual corresponds to the price and product characteristics of which the dimension is 
1 × K .    We define the parameters in mean utility, β and α , as  1 θ  and the parameters for interaction terms,  ϕ σ η , ,  
                                                           
16 A alternative approach to solving the dimensionality problem in the differentiated product markets is to use a multi-level 
demand system for differentiated products (Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, 1994, Cotterill, 1994, Cotterill and Samson, 2002 ) 
which is an application of  multi-stage  budgeting.   
17 For the logit model, consumers have the same parameters in the utility function and the individual heterogeneity is modeled just 
in the error term. 
18  i v  is  1 ) 1 ( × + K  vector. We represent the element of  i v  which interact with price as  ) 1 ( + K i v  and other elements which interact 
with product characteristics as  ik v . 
12 (, , :) (, ,,; ) ijm jm j jm jm ijm j jm i i ijm ux p x p v D δ ξθ µ θ ε =+ +
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The consumer’s marginal utility of income is  
 
 
                       . 
 
iom m i i m m i v D u ε σ φ ξ + + + = 0 0 0 0 0   is indirect utility of outside good option.
 19 
Let F be the joint distribution function of  v D, and  ε  and then let  jm A  represent the set of the values for 





If we assume that v D, and ε  are independent, then the market share of brand j in market m  is as follows. 
 
      (7) 
                                                                                        
 
Since the this integral is difficult to calculate as the dimension of the consumer characteristics increase, a 






where  ijm s  is the probability that consumer i chooses brand  j  in the market m  and N is the number of individuals 
sampled in each market. 
 
3.2 Pricing Relationships: Nash-Bertrand & Collusion  
Suppose that each manufacturer  f  in a total of F firms produces goods j=1,…., f J  and  that a firm’s marginal 
cost is constant for each product and varies across markets;  jm mc , then a firm’s profit in market m





                                                           
19 In this paper we define the total volume of processed cheese sold as market size and we treat the private labels and other small 
share brands that are not included in the analysis as the outside good. Considering that a cheeseburger costs very little more than a 
hamburger, an increase in the processed cheese price would not make people shift away from consumption of cheeseburgers and 
consume hamburgers instead. Rather, people would substitute to private labels or relatively cheaper brands that are not included 
as inside goods.  Nevo (2001) assumed the size of the market to be one serving of cereal per capita per day and BLP(1995) use 
the number of automobiles sold as market size.   
20 In this paper we assume that firms solve profit maximization problem in each market separately rather than coordinate pricing 
across markets. 
{ , , | 0,1,,,, } jm ijm ihm A Dv u u h J ε => ∀ =
2 (, ,; ) ( ,,) (| ,) (| ) ( )
jm jm
jm AA s x p dF D v dF D v dF v D dF D δθ ε ε == ∫∫ () () ( )
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where M is market size and  jm s (p) is the market share of  j  in market m .  Then we can solve the multi-product 
firm’s profit maximization problem for the different pricing games.  
First, let us assume that firms in processed cheese market behave as posited by Bertrand-Nash competition. For 






When a firm produces many brands, it maximizes the sum of brands profits in the firm. So, the second term 
includes the impact of  jm p  on the other brands’ revenues inside the firm as well as the own price effect on its 
revenue.  In other words a firm prices its own brands in a fully collusive fashion. 
In the case of market under collusive pricing of brand cheeses, each brand has to take into account the effect of 
its price change on other firms’ brands as well as the brands in the same firm.   Hence, the first-order condition for 






    
                              where ' ,......., 1 f J s =   f J j ,......., 1 =  
                             




     
where  p , mc and s (p) are a price vector for all brands, a vector of marginal costs of all brands and a vector of 
market shares. And  J J * = ∆ matrix with elements; 
 




    ,if brand k and j are produced by the same firm in the Nash model 
p
                or by a colluder in the collusion model










From (12), we can solve for marginal cost for each brand for each market conditional upon the assumed market 





So, the estimated marginal cost depends on the equilibrium price, the parameters of the demand system and 
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3.3 A Counterfactual Simulation of Price Pass-Through and Related Welfare Analysis 
After recovering all the demand side parameters and marginal costs, one can simulate price pass-through using 
the estimated structural model. We assume that a firm’s marginal cost consists two parts.  These parts are an industry 
specific component and a brand specific component. Then marginal cost for each cheese brand  j in market m  is  
 
(14)                 
 
 
where  m mc  is a common component in the market or industry-wide component and  j mc  is a brand specific 
component. And  jm ε  is an iid  error term.  We assume that market components and brand components are 
independent of each other and brand -specific components are also uncorrelated for brands k and j.
21   
 In this paper, we assume that there is an industry-wide common shock for each brand in each market and so 




mc.  Following the cost shock, market prices will converge to new equilibrium. 




                                    
 





Where  p ∆ is the difference between the new equilibrium price that solves system (15) and the old price and 
^
mc mc mc − = ∆
−
.  We perturb the system (15) with different sizes of marginal cost shocks. The cost shock ranges 
from 0.1cents/serving to 1.2 cents per serving of processed cheese.
23 As prices change correspondingly with respect to 
the marginal cost shocks, the welfare of consumers will also change.
24  Consumer welfare change is estimated by the 
compensating variation, which measures the net revenue of a planner who must compensate the consumer for the 
price change after it occurs, bringing the consumer back to the original utility level.
 25   We estimate the consumer 
welfare changes for each regime of competition.  Depending on the nature of competition, the price pass-through rate 
will be different and the size of the compensating variation will vary.  
 
3.4 Estimation 
To estimate the demand function we need to control for correlation between prices and error term in the mean 
utility function. It is difficult to justify a claim that price is independent of unobservable characteristics, which have 
the interpretation of unobserved product quality.
26   
                                                           
21 Here, for notational convenience, we do not project the marginal cost on a firm specific component. Since we analyze an 
industry-wide cost shock, this assumption will not affect the results. For price pass through simulation and consumer welfare 
analysis, we assume that consumer’s marginal utility of income does not change following cost shocks and utility from outside 
good also does not change.  
22 Nevo(2000) used a similar technique for merger analysis.  
23 This allows for up to approximately 10 % changes in marginal cost. See table 5 for each brand’s estimated marginal cost per 
serving.    
24 Here, we assume that the estimated demand side parameters do not change and prices will change corresponding to the change 
in marginal cost. 
25 McFadden (1981), Small and Rosen (1983). 
26 The correlation between price and unobserved characteristics is positive because higher quality could lead suppliers to set 
higher prices. Trajtenberg (1989,1990) found that demand for CT scanners was estimated to be positively sloped with price 
jm m j jm mc mc mc ε = ++
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In the model we have to find variables that are correlated with price but are independent of unobserved product 
characteristics.  Estimation requires an instrument vector with rank of at least the dimensionality of the parameter 
vectors.   One of the instruments typically used is a variable that represents closeness in product space in the 
particular markets (BLP,1995, Bresnahan, Stern and Trajsenberg ,1997).  Such instruments, however, are most 
appropriate for dynamically changing markets in which product characteristics evolve continuously.  If a market is 
mature and product characteristics do not change much, then this instrumental variable will not change across markets 
and it will have little identifying power. Another approach is to exploit the panel structure of the data. Examples of 
this approach are found in Hausman (1994), Cotterill (1994) and Nevo (2001). The identifying assumption is that, 
controlling for brand-specific means and demographics, city specific demand shocks are independent across cities. 
Given this assumption, a demand shock for a particular brand will be independent of prices of the same brand in other 
cities. Due to the common marginal cost, prices of a brand in different cities within a region will be correlated, and 
therefore can be used as valid instrument variables.   We follow this approach.  However, we modify it in response to 
recent criticism.
27 If there is a national or regional demand shock, this shock will increase the unobserved valuation of 
all brands in all cities and the independence assumption will be violated. Also if advertising campaigns and 
promotions are coordinated across cities, then these activities will increase the demand in the cities that are included 
in the activities, so the independence assumption will be violated for those cities.  Hence, to control for aggregate 
demand shocks, we also include time dummy fixed effects in the regression model and use them as instruments.  
 Let  Z  is N by L matrix with its row k z  and  ) (θ ξ  is N by 1 error tem in mean utility with its row k ξ .
28  Then 
the moment condition that the instrumental variables are orthogonal to the structural error, error terms in the mean 
utility, is used to form the GMM objective function,  0 ]   ) ( [ = θ ξk k z E . Then sample moment will be  
 
                       . 
 
 
Now we search for θ  which minimizes the GMM objective function. The GMM estimate is    
                                           
 (17) 
 
Where W  is a consistent estimate of inverse of asymptotic variance of ). (θ
−




  Table 3 shows the estimated demand side parameters.  For the parameter estimates of mean utility, the 
coefficient on PRICE is negative and significant and FAT is positive and significant. This is possibly because the 
average consumer who purchases processed cheese are not sensitive to the health issues involving FAT but instead 
wants the richer taste from higher butterfat.  However, the sensitivity to fat increases as income rises. It is captured in 
the negative and significant interaction term between fat and income, FAT*INCOME.  SODIUM has a negative and 
significant effect on the mean utility.  
Table 4 shows own and cross price elasticities.  All estimates have the expected signs. An immediate 
consequence of product differentiation is that cross-price elasticities are generally positive and finite. In contrast, if 
products were homogenous, the cross-price elasticities would be infinite at equal prices and zero at all others.  The 
results indicate that cross price elasticities between regular segment and low fat segment were asymmetric. Cross 
price elasticities of low fat segment corresponding to price changes of regular segment brands are higher than those of 
regular segment with respect to the price changes in low fat segment brands.  This may suggest that the consumers 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
because of the omission of unobserved quality, which was positively correlated with price.    
27 Refer to Bresnahan’s comment on Hausman (1996). 
28 We introduce brand dummies as well as time dummies in the model. Hence, a brand specific component and a time specific 
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who consumed regular segment cheeses were more willing to shift their demand toward low fat high priced brand 
cheeses when there were increases in the prices of regular segment. But consumers who usually consumed low fat 
segment cheeses did not change their demand much toward low price regular segment cheeses. This might have 
provided an incentive for Phillip Morris to introduce 3 low fat segment cheeses to capture consumers who were 
sensitive to fat and less sensitive to prices. Meanwhile, if we look at the cross elasticities inside the Phillip Morris 
company, their magnitudes are substantial especially corresponding to the price changes of Kraft and Velveeta. This 
suggests cannibalism among brands if only one price changes; however a joint pricing strategy across the portfolio 
can internalizes these cross price elasticities and produces profits.  
Table 5 shows the cost estimates under the assumption of Bertrand-Nash competition and collusive pricing 
among branded product firms, respectively.  For any given prices collusive pricing implies low marginal costs and 
higher markups than were found under the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition.  
 Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of the estimated price pass-through rates, which are defined as percentage 
change in price corresponding to decreases in cost.  Under collusion, the pass- through rates for all brands falls 
between 21 % and 34 % and its variation among firms is not wide through the entire range of the shock.  Meanwhile, 
as the regime of competition among firms changes to Bertrand-Nash, not only do the brand level pass-through rates 
increase, the variation among firms also widens. When the cost shock is 1 cent per serving, which is around 10 % 
decrease in marginal cost, the range of pass through is 63% ~ 101%.  
Relating to the previous literature on the relationship between the shape of demand curve and pass through rate, 
we may not be able to directly compare our results with the stylized facts in homogenous product markets because a 
brand’s price pass through rate in our model depends on the other brands’ demand surfaces as well as its own demand 
surface as in equation (15).  The simulation results, however, indicate that median pass through rates are close to what 
a linear demand curve predicts. Our demand specification allows both overshooting and undershooting of price pass 
through, i.e, pass through rates above and below 100 %, so these results are not constrained by functional form as in 
the case with a linear or logarithmic demand specification.
29 Furthermore, the same brand has a different price pass 
through rate in different markets. This is because the shape of a brand’s market share function differs across markets. 
The shapes of the demand curves in our model are determined by the product characteristics and the distribution of 
consumer characteristics.  So, the demand specification we use here provides a very flexible analysis of price pass 
through across markets.          
Table 10 shows the consumer welfare change which is estimated by the compensating variation after a shock that 
decreases marginal cost. CV1 and CV2 represent the compensating variations under Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and 
collusive pricing, respectively. The CV is 0.73 cents per person for a 1 cent marginal cost decrease under Nash price 
competition while it is 0.24 cents under collusive pricing. The ratio of CV2 to CV1 is 33%. So, under collusive 
pricing, the increase in consumer welfare following a cost decrease is 33% of that in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.  
Since our model is symmetric, the price increase corresponding to cost increases is higher under Nash-Bertrand 
competition than under collusive pricing and a cost increase hurts consumers less when pricing is collusive (Table 
11).  A policy implication of this result is that we should not always view a high increase in price following an 
unfavorable shock as evidence of collusive market power. Rather, it may be an evidence of Nash-Bertrand 
competition in a differentiated product market. 
 
5. Specification Test: A Test of the Maintained Competitive Hypothesis 
 
In this paper we have estimated brand level marginal costs under two alternatively assumed pricing regimes. 
Here we test to determine which pricing regime more closely fits observed pricing conduct.  Our specification test is
30 
to evaluate which set of estimated marginal costs best represents the potentially true marginal cost. R
2 values are used 
to evaluate the predictive power of sets of cost parameters resulting from estimation under the competing conduct 
assumptions and an F-statistic is used to establish whether the marginal cost parameters resulting from each model are 
                                                           
29 See Cotterill et. al. ( 2001) for analysis of this issue. 
30 The way to structure a specification test can depend on model structure. For example, Bresnahan (1987) used a likelihood ratio 
test of a non-nested hypothesis for the U.S automobile industry. Market Structure, Price Pass-Through, and Welfare With Differentiated Products  Kim 
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statistically different from one another.   
Table 12 shows the results of regressions of predicted marginal costs on factors which should affect marginal 
costs. For each regression, we include wage, electricity price, milk price, diesel fuel prices, brand dummies, and city 
specific dummies. We also include the ratio of unit sales to volume sales to take into account the economies of size 
that occur when consumers buy bigger packages of cheese. Wage is the Employment Cost Index for non-durable 
goods manufacturing sector and Electricity is the PPI (Producer Price Index) for industrial electric power and Diesel 
fuel is the PPI for #2 Diesel fuel. These were obtained from BLS(Bureau of Labor Statistics) indices. The milk price 
is the raw milk price from the USDA federal milk order statistics. In terms of R
2 values, we see that the estimated 
marginal cost under Nash-price competition better represents the real world cost data. The R
2  value for the 
specification for Nash price competition is 0.31 and that for collusive pricing is 0.20. Hence the fit for Nash price 
competition is 0.11 higher than that for collusive pricing.    However, if we want to conclude that the estimated 
marginal cost from Nash price competition model has a better fit, we need to prove that the coefficient estimates of 
two regressions are different.  This implies that the relationship between marginal cost and its components are 
different between Nash price competition and collusive pricing.   
To test the difference of the coefficient estimates between the two regressions, we employ an F-test which has 
been used for tests of structural change.  Our test is an analogue of a test for structural change even though the values 
of independent variables are the same for both the regimes. To implement an F-test, we save the sum of residual 
squares from separate regressions for Nash price competition and collusive pricing.  We then pool the two samples 





This test rejects the null that the coefficients estimates from two regimes of competition are same at 1 % level.  
Hence, we have verified that the firm conduct in the real world in the processed cheese market appears to be closer to 





 Our main contributions to the price pass-through literature are three-fold. First, we extend the price pass-through 
analysis into a price competition model of a differentiated products market. Previously, such an analysis has been 
mostly limited to homogenous goods markets analyzed with quantity conjectures models. Second, We use a flexible 
demand specification that captures the effect of demand surface curvature on pass through rate. Finally, we use a 
simulation-based analysis of price pass-through because the comparative static analysis which has been used 
extensively in homogenous product markets will not work well in a differentiated products market as the number of 
products in a market increases. And one has very few brand level cost variables to identify complete models of 
demand and supply side interaction.  
We have focused here on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and collusion. Similar studies would be possible of 
other equilibrium concepts such as semi-collusion and a firm’s deviation to or from collusion using a cost shock as a 
focal point.  A related avenue is a dynamic model that could account for changes in firms’ strategies over time. Still 
another direction for research is to analyze pass through rate from manufacturer to retailer and from retailers to 
consumers. In this paper we assume that manufacturers and retailers are vertically integrated.    
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Table 1.  Market share, Prices and Product Characteristics 
  Market 







Kraft(P) 0.2909  14.197  90  7  25  380 
Velveeta(P) 0.1987  12.230  90  6  25  400 
Light N Lively(P)  0.0088  17.334  70  4  15  406 
Kraft Free(P)  0.0310  16.541  42   0.3  5  273 
Kraft Light (P)  0.0169  15.348  70  4  20  160 
Velveeta Light(P)  0.0224  12.186  60  3  15  430 
Borden(B) 0.0662  12.931  80  6  20  360 
Lite Line(B)  0.0061  19.456  50  2  15  171 
Land O’lakes(L)  0.0064  11.990  110  9  26  430 
Weight  Watchers(H)  0.0059  15.376  50  2  7.5  400 
Note: Market share and price are the medians for all city-quarter markets. The unit of price is cents per 







Table 2.  Demographic Variables 
 Median  Mean  Std  Min  Max 
Log (Income)  7.835  7.838  0.905  0.405  10.742 
Log (Age)  3.465  3.241  0.940  0  4.564 
Child 0  0.255  0.436  0  1 
Nonwhite 0  0.155  0.362  0  1 
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Table 3.  Demand Parameter Estimates: Mixed Logit 
Parameter Estimates     Standard 
Errors 
CONTANT   -6.4305  **  0.8255 
PRICE   -6.9269  **  0.9207 
FAT   0.5990  **  0.0825 
SODIUM   -2.1397  **  0.1674 
INCOME   20.6871  **  9.8835 
NONWHITE   -5.9528  **  1.6391 
PRICE*INCOME   -20.0635  **  6.8385 
PRICE*INCOME^2  9.1480  **  3.2117 
PRICE*AGE   -2.1751  *  1.4795 
PRICE*CHILD   2.5205  *  1.3550 
FAT*INCOME   -0.1490  **  0.0419 
CONSTANT* 1 v    0.9280    1.0675 
PRICE* 2 v    1.9152  **  0.6817 
FAT* 3 v    2.6675  *  1.3746 
SODIUM* 4 v    3.0215  *  1.5379 
 
Note: * t-value > 1, **: t-value >2 
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Table 4.   Own and Cross Elasticities 
 
   
Regular 
Segment 
   





















Kraft(P)  -4.705 1.645  0.844  0.236  0.027 0.156  0.198 0.251 0.007 0.034 
Regular 
Segment  Velveeta(P)  1.276 -5.853  0.961  0.197  0.033 0.207  0.201 0.482 0.010 0.048 
 
Borden(B)  1.515 1.060  -7.864  0.242  0.030 0.221  0.226 0.350 0.010 0.054 
  Land 
O’Lakes(L)  1.214 1.023  2.217  -8.531  0.049 0.180  0.601 0.434 0.011 0.057 
  Light N 
Lively(P)  0.660 0.521  0.232  0.034  -3.894  0.092  0.067 0.114 0.021 0.020 
 
Kraft free(P)  0.115 0.838  0.410  0.032  0.025  -5.803  0.201 0.303 0.010 0.060 
Low Fat 
Segment  Kraft light(P)  0.604 0.579  0.780  0.190  0.025 0.351  -7.550 0.308 0.012 0.051 
  Velveeta 
light(P)  0.872 0.914  1.002  0.133 0.046  0.426  0.261  -8.321  0.016  0.084 
 
Lite Line(B)  0.148 0.192  0.099  0.010  0.026 0.049 0.028  0.049 -4.994 0.009 
  Weight 
Watchers(H)  0.246 0.666  0.857  0.087 0.043  0.512  0.266  0.464  0.020  -7.216 
 
Note: Elasticities are median values for all markets;  P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co.  Row is i and column is j. 
Each cell (i,j) gives the percent change in market share of brand i corresponding to a 1 percent change in price of brand j. 
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Table 5.  Marginal cost, Markup and Margin 














Kraft(P) 7.824  6.075  42.719  4.695  9.788  68.318 
Velveeta(P) 6.686  5.528  45.111  4.102  8.460  67.797 
Light N Lively(P)  10.317  6.177  36.938  7.083  10.105  58.535 
Kraft Free(P)  10.566  5.489  35.075  7.722  8.289  52.483 
Kraft Light(P)  9.352  5.314  36.345  6.166  8.572  59.298 
Velveeta Light(P)  7.738  4.498  37.971  4.877  7.487  61.957 
Borden(B) 11.265  1.623  12.721  4.204  9.026  67.853 
Lite Line(B)  18.129  1.889  10.582  10.140  9.601  49.276 
Land O’Lakes(L)  10.555  1.374  11.695  3.560  8.400  70.888 
Weight Watchers(H)  12.892  1.957 12.577  5.574  9.500  63.103 
Note: Median values for all markets;  P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co.  Marginal 
costs and markups are cents per serving. 
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Table 6.  Pass-Through Rate (Nash-Bertrand) : Cost decrease
1 
Kraft(P)  87.36  88.42 89.19 88.76 88.64 88.53 
Velveeta(P)  84.16  85.12 84.92 84.64 84.54 84.25 
Light  N  Lively(P)  75.12  78.48 78.51 76.35 75.38 72.43 
Kraft  Free(P)  70.97  67.64 65.29 65.93 67.40 57.09 
Kraft  Light(P)  79.36  80.37 80.49 80.22 79.12 73.09 
Velveeta  Light(P)  82.48  83.44 83.40 82.56 82.03 76.07 
Borden(B)  101.35  101.21 101.35 101.15 100.71  99.64 
Lite  Line(B)  47.99  61.31 66.63 68.76 79.55 85.87 
Land  O'Lakes(L)  20.01  35.27 46.19 48.40 78.88 94.66 
Weight  Watchers(H)  6.41  26.93 35.64 44.73 63.41 79.75 




Table 7.  Pass-Through Rate (Collusion): Cost decrease 
Kraft(P)  30.37  30.85 30.74 30.93 30.42 30.19 
Velveeta(P)  28.97  29.27 29.18 29.24 28.74 28.57 
Light  N  Lively(P)  25.46  25.90 26.08 26.13 26.45 26.78 
Kraft  Free(P)  34.80  31.23 28.59 25.91 26.98 25.07 
Kraft  Light(P)  31.29  32.23 30.98 29.49 30.34 29.87 
Velveeta  Light(P)  29.22  30.84 30.97 31.27 30.83 29.97 
Borden(B)  30.16  30.54 30.45 30.38 30.12 29.23 
Lite  Line(B)  22.87  23.61 23.72 24.69 23.70 24.29 
Land  O'Lakes(L)  21.38  22.53 22.29 21.26 21.25 20.30 
Weight  Watchers(H)  26.08  26.64 26.83 25.98 25.45 25.21 
MC  shock  0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
 
 
                                                           
1 %, Median values for all markets. P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co.  Marginal cost shocks 
are cents per serving.  
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Table 8.  Pass-through Rates (Nash-Bertrand) : Cost increase
2 
Kraft(P)  87.95  90.04 90.86 90.84 92.33 92.83 
Velveeta(P)  84.30  85.88 87.14 87.30 88.43 88.48 
Light  N  Lively(P)  76.21  78.35 82.04 83.17 83.95 86.98 
Kraft  Free(P)  79.96  82.50 86.36 88.62 87.85 88.48 
Kraft  Light(P)  88.63  89.40 90.39 92.21 93.48 94.77 
Velveeta  Light(P)  84.04  86.84 87.41 89.02 90.68 91.20 
Borden(B)  102.67  103.24 103.76 104.06 104.32 104.63 
Lite  Line(B)  50.83  61.65 64.38 68.44 72.27 74.73 
Land  O'Lakes(L)  92.87  94.11 97.34 97.94 98.77 99.35 
Weight  Watchers(H)  59.50  74.31 84.66 89.25 92.27 94.24 













                                                           
2 %, Median values for all markets.  P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co.   Marginal cost shocks 




Table 9.  Pass through Rates (Collusion): Cost increase 
Kraft(P)  34.47  35.36 36.04 36.98 37.77 38.38 
Velveeta(P)  32.98  34.12 34.67 35.33 35.92 36.33 
Light  N  Lively(P)  29.79  31.34 32.60 33.13 35.06 35.69 
Kraft  Free(P)  44.97  48.48 51.34 51.49 52.16 53.70 
Kraft  Light(P)  48.96  48.79 50.12 52.18 52.52 52.96 
Velveeta  Light(P)  44.00  45.94 47.07 46.80 47.77 47.87 
Borden(B)  32.37  34.09 34.57 35.16 35.91 36.87 
Lite  Line(B)  27.02  30.50 32.64 33.35 33.70 35.19 
Land  O'Lakes(L)  24.71  27.17 28.41 28.61 29.65 30.87 
Weight  Watchers(H)  31.64  33.88 36.30 37.64 37.96 39.26 
MC  Shock  0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 Market Structure, Price Pass-Through, and Welfare With Differentiated Products  Kim 






Table 10.  Compensating Variation: Cost decrease
3 
Bertrand-Nash (A)  0.14  0.29  0.44  0.58  0.73  0.86 
Collusion (B)  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.19  0.24  0.29 
B/A(%) 34%  34%  33%  33%  33%  33% 
MC Shock 
(Cents)  0.2 0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.2 




Table 11. Compensating Variation: Cost increase 
Bertrand-Nash (A)  -0.14  -0.29  -0.45  -0.60  -0.75  -0.91 
Collusion (B)  -0.05  -0.10  -0.15  -0.20  -0.26  -0.32 
B/A(%)* 34%  34% 34%  34%  34%  35% 
MC Shock 
(Cents)  0.2 0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.2 
Note: Cents/per serving/per person.                       
                                                           
3  Median values for all markets.      
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Table 12.  Specification Test 


























2 0.312  0.201 
Note    (  ): t-values; Both regressions include brand dummies and city specific dummies;     







FOOD MARKETING POLICY CENTER 
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
 
  This series includes final reports for contract research 
conducted by Policy Center Staff.  The series also contains 
research direction and policy analysis papers.  Some of these 
reports have been commissioned by the Center and are authored by 
especially qualified individuals from other institutions.  (A list of 
previous reports in the series is given on the inside back cover.)  
Other publications distributed by the Policy Center are the 
Working Paper Series, Journal Reprint Series for Regional 
Research Project NE-165: Private Strategies, Public Policies, and 
Food System Performance, and the Food Marketing Issue Paper 
Series.  Food Marketing Policy Center staff contribute to these 
series.  Individuals may receive a list of publications in these series 
and paper copies of older Research Reports are available for 
$20.00 each, $5.00 for students. Call or mail your request at the 
number or address below.  Please make all checks payable to the 
University of Connecticut. Research Reports can be downloaded 
free of charge from our website given below. 
 
Food Marketing Policy Center 
1376 Storrs Road, Unit 4021 
University of Connecticut 
Storrs, CT 06269-4021 
 
Tel: (860) 486-1927 
FAX: (860) 486-2461 
email: fmpc@uconn.edu 
http://www.fmpc.uconn.edu 
 
 